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Abstract
This paper investigates micro- and macro-level determinants of participation in demonstra-
tions worldwide, focusing on the role of resources and grievances across different demo-
cratic contexts. The analysis relies on a data set stemming from the ex-post harmonization 
of five international survey projects covering 100 countries between 1989 and 2009: Amer-
icas Barometer, Asia Europe Survey, European Values Study, International Social Survey 
Programme, and the World Values Survey. Results provide mixed support for previous 
findings and point to new insights. First, I find that the positive association between educa-
tion and participation in demonstrations is stronger in democratic countries than in non-
democracies, but there is no evidence of similar variation in the case of income. Second, 
the effect of trust in parliament is U-shaped, and more pronounced in non-democracies 
compared to democracies. Overall the findings indicate that the role of resources as well as 
disaffection with the political system in explaining participation in demonstrations depends 
on the political context, thus emphasizing the importance of incorporating both levels of 
analysis in theoretical and empirical models. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with ex-post harmonization of survey data.
Keywords: political participation, education, trust in state institutions, democracy, survey 
data harmonization, cross-national research
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Political participation figures prominently in social science research as an avenue 
for citizens to communicate their views and to voice protest or support for political 
leaders. Much of cross-national research on political participation has been carried 
out in wealthy democracies, and this has shaped our understanding of the subject. 
Substantially less is known about determinants of participation in non-democratic 
and economically less-developed countries, and especially how they compare to 
those observed in democracies. This paper addresses long-standing questions in 
research on political behavior that pertain to the role of resources and grievances 
across political contexts (Cichocka et al., 2017; Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 
2010), thus contributing to debates on the micro- and macro-determinants of politi-
cal participation. 
To extend the coverage and increase the representation of less democratic and 
economically developed countries, I rely on ex-post harmonized survey data from 
the Survey Data Recycling project (SDR, Slomczynski et al., 2017). Ex-post har-
monization refers to procedures applied to existing data sets that were not created 
with comparability in mind, to transform original data sets in a way that enables 
us to analyze them as a single data source (Wolf, Schneider, Behr, & Joye, 2016). 
In this paper I use a subset of the SDR v.1 data (Slomczynski, Jenkins et al., 2017) 
consisting of five cross-national survey projects: Americas Barometer, Asia Europe 
Survey, European Values Study, International Social Survey Programme, and the 
World Values Survey. Together the data cover 100 countries between 1989 and 
2009. 
Results support prior findings about the positive association between individ-
ual resources – education and income – and participation in demonstrations, and 
further show that the association between education and participation is substan-
tially stronger in democratic than in non-democratic countries. The findings related 
to the role of political trust are more complex and point to new insights: I find that 
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trust is associated with the probability of demonstrating in a U-shaped way, and 
this pattern is more pronounced in non-democratic countries than in democracies.
The paper begins by presenting theoretical considerations on the role of 
resources, grievances, and the political context for political participation. Next, I 
describe the analytic strategy, including the harmonized survey data, as well as 
the process of arriving at the final data set for analysis. Since ex-post survey data 
harmonization is not a standard procedure in the social sciences, I discuss the har-
monization strategy and the harmonization process of the survey variables used in 
this paper and the associated advantages and risks in some detail. After a descrip-
tion of the models, I turn to the results, followed by a discussion of the theoreti-
cal and methodological implications of the study. Beyond describing analyses using 
data from a specific harmonization project, the issues discussed in this paper are more 
broadly applicable to analyzing survey data characterized by varying quality and 
methodology.
Determinants of Participation in Demonstrations
Like most social phenomena, political participation results from a combination of 
factors, both individual and contextual, and is best analyzed in a multilevel the-
oretical framework (Dalton et al., 2010). Theories explaining political participa-
tion generally focus either on factors that enable participation by facilitating or 
removing barriers, or on factors that motivate participation by spurring opposition. 
According to the civic voluntarism model, political participation is enabled by the 
presence of resources (Berinsky, 2002; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Verba, 
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). These resources can be of different kinds, including 
economic, but also civic skills, and the general expectation is that individuals with 
greater resources will be more likely to participate. The second approach, applied 
most often to contentious political participation, conceptualizes participation as 
motivated by grievances, which push people to go out into the streets and demand 
change (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; Wilkes, 2004). Grievances are 
most frequently related to economic hardship, both absolute and relative (Klander-
mans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008), but can also result from personal 
or political dissatisfaction (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982).
The Role of Resources: Income and Education
When focusing on economic well-being, the two theoretical approaches lead to 
contradictory hypotheses. While in the resource approach income is expected to be 
positively associated with the probability of participation, the grievance approach 
predicts a negative association. Empirical studies tend to support the first claim, 
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and find that individuals with higher income are more likely to participate in poli-
tics, both in conventional and unconventional activities (Loose & Jae, 2011; Marsh 
& Kaase, 1979; Quaranta, 2015).
However, not all resources are economic. Research has repeatedly shown 
that the better educated are more likely to engage in behaviors commonly associ-
ated with active citizenry: membership in voluntary associations (Putnam, 2000), 
protest behavior (Dalton et al., 2010), contacting politicians (Aars & Strømsnes, 
2007), and reporting crimes to the police (Botero, Ponce, & Shleifer, 2012). View-
ing education as a resource, explanations typically emphasize the cognitive costs of 
participation that are easier to overcome for educated individuals, who have better 
knowledge of the political system, can evaluate the performance of state institu-
tions more accurately, and - in the case of under-performance - are better equipped 
to take action (Ceci, 1991; Marks, 2013; Winship & Korenman, 1997). 
Political Trust as Grievance or as Resource
The relationship between political trust and political participation depends on the 
type of participation (see Gabriel, 2017, for a review). Protest behavior is considered 
more likely among individuals with low political trust, who reject conventional 
or “conformist” modes of participation and are more likely to engage in uncon-
ventional, elite-challenging activities, or withdraw from participation altogether 
(Citrin, 1974). In this sense, low trust constitutes a grievance against the political 
system. On the other hand, some level of trust in state institutions seems to be nec-
essary for a person to engage in any political activity whose success depends on 
state responsiveness, which makes trust a resource that enables action (Cichocka et 
al., 2017).
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence. Some studies in Europe find a 
negative effect of political trust on protest activities, such as participation in dem-
onstrations, boycotts, and signing petitions (Braun & Hutter, 2016; Kaase, 1999; 
Marien & Christensen, 2013; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). Another analysis of data 
from European countries found a positive effect of trust in the national parliament 
on “soft protest” (Dubrow, Slomczynski, & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2008). Yet another 
study, this time with a global scope, identified no effect of trust in parliament on 
protest participation (Dalton et al., 2010). Meanwhile, analyses by Cichocka and 
colleagues (2017) found a negative quadratic association between trust in state 
institutions and engaging in normative collective action. According to them, indi-
viduals having the least trust do not believe in the responsiveness of the state to 
protest, while those with very high trust exhibit a level of support which leaves little 
to protest against. 
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The Role of the Political Context
The same forms of political participation may have a different meaning depend-
ing on the political context. In democratic countries, activities such as attending 
demonstrations or wearing badges are legal, legitimate and generally safe, and have 
largely become part of the normal repertoire of politics (Dubrow et al., 2008; New-
ton & Montero, 2007). In authoritarian regimes, the same activities may be illegal 
and have a high chance of being repressed. 
Considerations of contextual factors that shape political participation focus 
on the role of political opportunities, with theoretical expectations depending on 
whether the emphasis is on the enabling or on the motivating role of the context. 
Some scholars argue that openness of the political system, approval of mass par-
ticipation, and responsiveness to protesters’ demands, will encourage more par-
ticipation (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975; Tarrow, 2011). Others claim that closed politi-
cal systems that discourage civic engagement will increase protest participation 
if institutionalized channels are not accessible (Kitschelt, 1986). The differences 
in the mechanisms leading to political participation in democratic and non-demo-
cratic countries may result in a different composition of participants with regard to 
resources and grievances, as discussed above.
Hypotheses
If regime openness is generally associated with increased participation, it can be 
expected that the effect is stronger for individuals with more resources, and this 
is so for two reasons. First, these individuals are better equipped to identify and 
navigate the opportunities created by the political system. Second, in the case 
of low political openness and the potential for state repression, those with more 
resources have more to lose. Consequently, I expect that the positive association 
between individual resources – education and income - and participation in dem-
onstrations is stronger in more democratic countries than in less democratic ones 
(Hypothesis 1a and 1b for the effects of education and income, respectively).
The role of political trust is also expected to vary across political contexts, in 
part due to the likely different nature of political participation following Kerbo’s 
(Kerbo, 1982) distinction between movements of crisis and movements of affluence. 
In non-democratic countries, where collective action is discouraged or prohibited, 
I expect high levels of political trust to be associated with regime loyalty and low 
propensity to participate in demonstrations (Hypothesis 2). In these countries the 
distrust and dissatisfaction of citizens may accumulate and erupt in the form of 
mass demonstrations despite the fear of state repression, resulting in higher levels of 
participation in demonstrations among individuals with low political trust. On the 
other hand, following Cichocka et al. (2017), I expect that in democratic countries 
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the probability of participation is higher among individuals with medium levels of 
political trust than those with the highest and lowest trust levels (Hypothesis 3).
Analytic Strategy
Opportunities and Challenges of Survey Data Harmonization
Most empirical research of social and political issues focuses on democratic coun-
tries, largely because of the limited availability of survey data necessary to measure 
values, attitudes and participation from countries outside of the WEIRD (Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic, cf. Henrich, Heine, & Norenza-
yan, 2010) zone (Kołczyńska, 2014; Slomczynski & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2006). Even 
beyond Europe, single survey programs do not include sufficient countries to ana-
lyze social and political phenomena on a global scale. To address this problem, 
the Survey Data Recycling project (SDR, Slomczynski & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2018; 
Słomczyński et al., 2016) set out to develop tools for combining data from many 
cross-national survey projects that were not intended to be comparable via ex-post 
harmonization, and for using the resulting harmonized data in substantive analyses. 
The primary advantage of ex-post survey data harmonization is the increased 
coverage of countries and time points in the harmonized data set compared to 
data sets of single survey projects. This creates new opportunities for comparative 
research by enabling comparisons between countries and regions that are not cov-
ered by the same survey project, as well as over time. Associated costs are related 
to the increased methodological variation in the harmonized data set, including in 
the formulation of survey questions, the properties of response scales, or the sample 
types. All these factors can affect sample distributions of respondents’ answers, and 
are a potential risk to the validity of conclusions stemming from analyses of ex-post 
harmonized data.
The SDR project proposes to address this issue by recording methodological 
information about the original (source) surveys as separate variables in the har-
monized data set. This strategy is similar to the one employed by Milanovic in 
the All the Ginis data set of income inequality measures, where dummy variables 
distinguish between Gini coefficients that can potentially be incomparable (Mila-
novic, 2014). The methodological adjustment variables are of two types: harmoni-
zation controls and quality controls (Slomczynski & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2018). Har-
monization controls are created during the harmonization of source variables and 
accompany each target (harmonized) variable. They capture properties of survey 
items that would be lost in the process of recoding or rescaling source variables 
into target variables, such as the length of response scales or characteristics of ques-
tion wording. Harmonization controls are item-specific, i.e., they are constructed 
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individually for each target variable on the basis of the relevant methodological 
literature, which helps to identify the important features of items that are worth 
preserving, and following a review of source items in existing surveys to under-
stand the variation in their design.
Quality control variables address the inter-survey variation in the methodol-
ogy of the survey process or the quality of the data. Quality controls are either 
constructed on the basis of the available survey documentation (codebooks, study 
descriptions, technical reports) and describe important elements of the survey life-
cycle, such as type of sample, or are derived from data records in the source data 
files to flag irregularities, such as duplicated records. Both types of control vari-
ables can be used in two ways: for the selection of surveys that meet pre-defined 
criteria or directly in the substantive models designed to test the hypotheses of the 
relationship between the chosen measures. 
To sum up, while ex-post harmonization of surveys generally includes steps as 
presented below (cf. Granda et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 2016), the process employed in 
the SDR project includes additional stages marked in italics:
(1) concept definition: 
a defining the target concept(s) to be measured with the survey variables, gui-
ded by the research question(s) and theoretical framework; 
b based on this definition, developing a preliminary coding scheme or choo-
sing a coding scale for the harmonized (target) variable; 
(2) data preparation: 
a identifying survey projects that meet the requirements regarding the pre-
sence of questions corresponding to the concepts identified in step 1.a, the 
target population and representativeness, and potentially other factors, and 
gathering their data and documentation;
b examining the methodological variation among the gathered survey pro-
jects with regard to the design of the survey items of interest and the overall 
survey process on the basis of the survey documentation; 
c describing surveys in terms of their methodology (e.g., sample type) and 
constructing survey quality indicators (e.g., the presence or absence of 
quality assurance procedures, proportion of duplicated cases); 
d identifying the candidate source variables, that is relevant question items in 
the gathered source surveys that correspond to the target concept(s) defined 
in step 1.a;
e examining the variation in the design of the selected survey items given the 
literature on survey methodology and the effects of item design on respon-
dents’ answers; 
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f identifying relevant dimensions of variation between the survey items (e.g., 
related to item wording, response options or scales, position in the questi-
onnaire, filtering) to be captured by harmonization control variables;
g adjusting the coding scheme or scale of the harmonized (target variable) 
based on the observed variation in the survey items;
(3) harmonization: 
a transforming (recoding) source variables into target variable(s) using the 
coding scheme established in step 2.g;
b constructing harmonization control variables to capture the properties of 
source variables that would be lost in the process of recoding (e.g., details 
of original question wording or original length or direction of response 
scales), identified in step 2.f;
(4) checking the target variable for errors and documentation of the whole process.
Data
The Survey Data Recycling v.1 data set (Slomczynski et al., 2017) stems from ex-
post harmonization following procedures described above of selected variables 
from 22 international survey projects. The following sections describe the steps and 
decisions a researcher needs to make to prepare a data subset for analysis. These 
decisions deal with (1) the selection of surveys and cases from the harmonized SDR 
data set, and (2) accounting for methodological variation, including differences in 
survey quality and the variation in item design, across surveys.
Data Selection
Availability of variables. Not every national survey in the SDR data contains 
items measuring all the necessary concepts, so the availability of appropriate vari-
ables is the first criterion in the selection of surveys for analysis. Further constraints 
can be imposed by the selection of certain methodological features of some of these 
variables, which I discuss below.
Out of the 1721 national surveys in the SDR Master file, of the surveys carried 
out in 1989 or later, the period I will analyze in this paper1, 646 national surveys 
have all the individual-level variables I want to include in models: participation in 
demonstrations (as the dependent variable), education, income, and trust in parlia-
ment (as individual-level independent variables), and age and gender (as controls). 
1 Prior to 1989 data coverage is strongly skewed towards Western democracies, with 
little variation among the covered countries.
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Sub-national samples. Some cross-national survey projects provide data for sam-
ples that are representative for sub-national populations, e.g., for a given region 
of the country. For example, the International Social Survey Programme typically 
has separate samples for East and West Germany. In the SDR v.1 data, national 
surveys are defined at the lowest possible level giving preference to sub-national 
samples where available. These include: Bosnia-Herzegovina (separate samples 
for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), Belgium 
(Flanders and Wallonia), Germany (East and West Germany), the United Kingdom 
(Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and Israel (separate samples for the Jewish 
and Arab populations). Most frequently, both split-up samples are provided, so that 
the entire territory of the given country is covered. To use data from split sam-
ples in an analysis of individuals nested in countries, I calculate additional weights 
proportional to the split samples’ shares in the country’s population. Occasionally, 
however, only one of the split samples is available, for example Belgium-Flanders 
in ISSP/2004, or Great Britain (without Northern Ireland) in ISSP/2014 or WVS/5. 
These “orphaned” samples are dropped from the analysis for two reasons. First, 
because of the lack of comparable contextual data on the level of the sub-national 
units. Second, because including them would mean that, for example, respondents 
from Belgium-Flanders are sometimes considered part of Belgium and sometimes 
– part of Belgium-Flanders, depending on the survey project, which creates dif-
ficulties for modeling. After eliminating the “orphaned” samples and combining 
sub-national samples into whole-nation samples, I am left with 628 surveys.
Selection on the properties of survey questions: Participation in demonstra-
tions. The formulation of items that aim to capture political participation varies 
across projects, but they generally have the following form: Have you performed 
[action type] in the last [time period]?, where the time period ranges from “12 
months” or “1 year” through 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10 years to questions without any 
time frame (SDHT, 2017, pp. 79–84). Logically, the probability of a positive answer 
depends, among other things, on the time length the questions ask about. For any 
individual, the probability of participating in a demonstration in the last 5 years is 
greater or equal to the probability of participating in a demonstration in the last 12 
months. This is why, when harmonizing data from different surveys, information 
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about the time span mentioned in the question must be recorded, and either used for 
the selection of data for analysis or accounted for when modeling the data2.
It is unclear how the probability of participating in demonstrations depends on 
the time span due to at least two complicating factors. First, opportunities to demon-
strate are not uniformly distributed in time. While occasional massive demonstra-
tion waves attract a substantial proportion of the population, there are also quieter 
times with fewer and less prominent events. Second, using retrospective questions 
introduces recall effects including temporal displacement, i.e. telescoping: respon-
dents tend to report events earlier or later than they actually happened (Gaskell, 
Wright, & O’Muircheartaigh, 2000; Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2006; Neter & 
Waksberg, 1964). Human memory errors, including telescoping, but also omissions 
and overreporting, are related to age and education, as well as to the length of the 
time period and the frequency and salience of events (Ayhan & Işiksal, 2004). It is 
also possible that accuracy in reporting participation by respondents varies across 
cultures (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984).
Since explicit modeling of recall effects across countries and cultures, time, 
and survey mode, is outside of the scope of this work, I restrict the data to surveys 
where questions asked about participation in demonstrations are without a time 
frame. This formulation is the most frequent among surveys in the SDR data set 
(SDHT, 2017), which provides sufficient variation in key country-level independent 
and control variables (quality of democracy, economic development), as well as 
large (and global) country coverage. Survey questions asking about participation in 
demonstrations “ever” can be understood as capturing a respondent‘s opinion about 
the legitimacy and perceived efficacy of the given form of participation, instead of 
actual past behavior in a temporal sense. Perceived efficacy is considered one of 
the main explanations for collective action (cf., Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 
2013, for a review), so this interpretation of the “ever” items is compatible with my 
theoretical framework.
Apart from the number of years in the question, items on participating in dem-
onstrations in the selected subset also differ with regard to one other feature identi-
fied as potentially influencing respondents‘ answers: whether the question about 
participation in demonstrations mentioned other forms of participation in addi-
2 The formulation in the original questions can also vary within the same project wave, 
but across countries. One example are questions V100-V103 in World Values Survey 
Wave 5, which ask about recent participation in four activities: petitions, boycotts, 
demonstrations, and “other”. According to the Master Questionnaire (WVS, 2005), the 
question is about participation in the last five years, but an analysis of country ques-
tionnaires reveals that in Hong Kong the question asked about the last 12 months, in 
Zambia about the last year. In Jordan there seems to be no indication of the time frame, 
and the question is missing from the questionnaire (and the data) from China, Colom-
bia, Egypt, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Spain, and New Zealand. With the exception of 
China, all the other eight surveys contained the variable on participation in demonstra-
tions “ever”. 
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tion to demonstrations. For example, the project Asia Europe Survey asked about 
attending a “a protest, march or demonstration” (Inoguchi, 2008, p. 17). Mentioning 
other forms of participation next to demonstrations in the same question could be 
expected to yield a higher share of positive answers compared to a similar question 
that asks only about participation in demonstrations (Kołczyńska & Slomczynski, 
2018), so surveys where questions about participation in demonstrations have this 
property are flagged with a control variable.
Non-unique records. Duplicate cases, or non-unique records, are a potential threat 
to data quality. In the SDR v.1 data set, the problem of duplicates was identified 
and analyzed by Slomczynski, Powałko, and Krauze (2017). Given the typical sur-
vey sample sizes and the number and types of survey items, encountering identical 
records can be considered a miracle or an error. Either way, they should be treated 
with suspicion. 
In the SDR v.1 data set non-unique records are marked with a flag. Since non-
unique records occur in the subset selected for analysis in this paper, I opted for the 
following strategy: surveys with more than five percent of duplicates are removed 
from the analysis, while in surveys with less than five percent of non-unique 
records, I drop all superfluous records following the recommendation of Sarracino 
and Mikucka (2017). The remaining subset consists of 332 national surveys.
Survey multiplets. Another issue that requires consideration are situations where 
more than one survey containing the necessary questions (after selecting the desired 
formulations) was carried out in the same country in the same year. Including them 
together in the models would increase the inequality in country coverage, and more 
frequently surveyed countries would weigh disproportionately on model estimates. 
To avoid this, from each country-year I selected only one sample with the largest 
proportion of cases without missing values on the variables of interest3. The result-
ing subset of the SDR data set used in the remainder of this paper includes data 
from 319 national surveys from five survey projects: editions 2004, 2006 and 2008 
of the Americas Barometer (Americas Barometer, 2012), Asia Europe Survey (Ino-
guchi, 2001), editions 2, 3, and 4 of the European Values Study (European Values 
Study, 2011), International Social Survey Programme edition 2004 (ISSP Research 
Group, 2012), and editions 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the World Values Survey (World Values 
Survey, 2009). The list of countries by project edition is presented in Appendix A.
Accounting for Methodological Variation Across Surveys
As already mentioned, there is considerable methodological variation across survey 
projects, as well as between national surveys within the same project, with regard 
to many aspects of the survey process, as well as with regard to the resulting survey 
quality. The goal is to identify factors that can potentially affect the distribution of 
the variables of interest.
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 14(1), 2020, pp. 91-126 102 
Item non-response. Item non-response, or the proportion of cases for which sub-
stantive responses for a given variable are not available, can be considered an indica-
tor of the quality of the survey item (Groves, 1989), because it captures two aspects 
of item quality: the ability of the given item to elicit responses from respondents, 
and the extent to which the variable represents the variation in the measured char-
acteristic in the population. To account for this, I include item non-response in the 
dependent variable as a control in the regression models.
Type of survey sample. All national surveys in SDR v.1 have samples coded on 
the basis of available documentation into seven categories: simple/stratified random 
sampling, multi-stage random sampling with individual register, multistage-ran-
dom sampling with address register, samples with a random route component, 
samples with a quota component, and samples with inadequate or missing sam-
pling descriptions. I include a control variable corresponding to the sample type to 
account for the possible systematic differences across national surveys relying on 
different types of samples.
Variables 
Trust in parliament
The question about trust in the national parliament is the most popular survey items 
on political trust (Kołczyńska & Slomczynski, 2018). The harmonized variable 
“trust in parliament” used in this study was constructed in two steps (SDHT, 2017, 
pp. 49–55). First, variables originally coded on a descending scale were reversed 
so that in all variables lower scores mean less trust and higher scores - more trust. 
Second, variables were transformed into the target 0-10 scale. This transformation 
assumed that for scales shorter than 11 points each source value was assigned the 
mean of the corresponding range of values on the target 0-10 scale. For example, if 
the original scale had five points, the lowest value corresponds to the range between 
0 and 2 on the 0-10 scale and was assigned the value of 1.
A control variable records the length of the original response scales in trust 
in parliament items in the source data, which in the case of the current analysis 
included questions with a 4-, 5-, and 7-point scales. Since the length of the original 
response scales influences the distribution of respondents’ answers, and especially 
the differences between odd- and even-numbered scales can have an effect on the 
comparability of responses to the trust item, this control variable is included in 
models.
Education
To measure education, I use the target variable “Education level” from the SDR 
data set, which is harmonized on the basis of source variables indicating respon-
103 Kołczyńska: Micro- and Macro-level Determinants of Participation
dents’ educational attainment in terms of levels (SDHT, 2017, pp. 26–31). I recoded 
the levels into years by assigning to every level of education the mean number of 
years of schooling as suggested by UNESCO (2013; see also Słomczyński et al., 
2016, pp. 181–182). 
The SDR data set contains a second measure of education – “Years of school-
ing” – harmonized independently from “Education level” on the basis of questions 
asking about the number of years of schooling completed by the respondent, or the 
respondent’s age at completion of education (SDHT, 2017, pp. 32–36). In surveys, in 
which “Education level” is not available, I used “Years of schooling” instead. Such 
cases are flagged with a control variable. 
I chose to rely on “Education level” as the primary source of information 
about respondent‘s education and use “Years of schooling” to fill in gaps, because 
“Years of schooling” was in many cases calculated from responses to questions 
asking about respondent‘s age of completion of (taken together with respondent‘s 
year of birth or age), which is sensitive to the effects of returning to school by adults 
and more prone to errors. 
Household income
The SDR data set does not contain any measure of individual economic status, 
so this variable was harmonized independently, in order to distinguish between 
the effects of economic status and of education (Kołczyńska & Powałko, 2019). 
The substantial variation in how the survey question about household income is asked 
(net or gross income, weekly, monthly, or annual income) and especially in how the 
responses are recorded (exact values, categories, quantiles) makes it hardly possible to 
harmonize household income in terms of assigning each respondent a monetary value 
in some common metric. Instead, the harmonized income variable was constructed 
by normalizing the original scale to the 0-100 range. Thus, the target variable “house-
hold income” captures the relative position of the respondent within the given national 
sample. It needs to be emphasized that this target variable does not allow for mean 
comparisons across samples.
Democracy
When looking at the whole spectrum of political regimes from autocracies to insti-
tutionalized democracies, the level of democracy may be treated as a less precise 
but appropriate indicator of the openness and responsiveness of the regime as well 
as of the probability of repression (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). To measure 
democracy, I use Freedom House “Freedom in the World” ratings for Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House, 2016). The advantage of this indicator 
is its wide use in quantitative social science research, which lends credibility and 
offers global coverage. The Freedom House codes Political Rights and Civil Liber-
ties on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the most and 7 the least freedom. I 
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use a sum of these measures, reversed so that the resulting variable is an indicator 
of democracy, not of the lack of democracy. The final variable is coded from 0 to 
12, where 0 corresponds to the lowest, and 12 to the highest level of freedoms and 
liberties4.
Control variables
In order to avoid attributing the effect of economic conditions to democracy, I con-
trol for GDP per capita using data from the World Bank‘s World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2017)5. I also control for age and gender, which are known to 
be associated with political participation. Descriptive statistics for all individual-, 
macro-level, and methodological variables in their original metrics are presented 
in Table 1.
Models 
To estimate the effects of micro- and macro-level factors, and their interactions, on 
reported participation in demonstrations, I estimate a series of three-level binary 
regression models, building up from the base model (Model 1) which takes the fol-
lowing form for individual i in country-year j in country k:
( ) 000 100 200  ijk ijk ijklogit participation education incomeγ γ γ= + + +
300 010 00 0 00ijk jk x jk ktrust democracy controls r uγ γ γ+ + + +
where 000γ  is the global intercept, 100γ , 200γ , and 300γ  are the coefficients for indi-
vidual-level education, income, and trust in parliament, respectively, 010γ  is the coef-
ficient for country-year-level democracy, and 00xγ  represents all coefficients for con-
trol variables at different levels, including substantive and methodological controls. 
Finally, 0 jkr  and 00ku  are the random intercept terms. 
Subsequent models each add an element of complexity. Model 2 adds a squared 
term for trust in parliament to test for quadratic effects of trust on participating 
in demonstrations. Models 3-5 include single cross-level interactions between the 
level of democracy and education, income, and trust in parliament, respectively. 
4 The Czech Republic and Slovakia prior to their split-up in 1993 are assigned ratings 
from Czechoslovakia. Serbia and Montenegro in 1996 and 2001, and Kosovo in 2008 
are assigned ratings from Yugoslavia for the respective years.
5 In rare cases when the value of GDP per capita was not available for the given country-
year, the value from the adjacent year is used. Data for Taiwan are not available in 
the World Bank, so instead values from the International Monetary Fund’s EconStats 
service are used: http://www.econstats.com/weo/CTWN.htm
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Model 6 includes all three interaction terms, and the final Model 7 adds the meth-
odological controls. In short, the models are built as follows:
Model 1: Base model;
Model 2: Model 1 + trust in parliament squared;
Model 3: Model 1 + education * democracy;
Model 4: Model 1 + income * democracy;
Model 5: Model 4 + trust in parliament * democracy + trust in parliament squared 
* democracy;
Model 6: Model 1 + education * democracy + income * democracy + trust in par-
liament squared + trust in parliament * democracy + trust in parliament squared 
* democracy;
Model 7: Model 6 + harmonization and methodological control variables.
In all analyses data are weighted with individual case weights provided in the 
source data sets and harmonized by SDR (SDHT, 2017, pp. 15–17). They are com-
bined with weights proportional to the populations of sub-national regions where 
split samples were merged into national samples. In the analyses, trust in parlia-
ment is group-mean centered around the mean of the country-year, to estimate 
the effects of the relative level of trust within the country-year. I also include the 
country-year mean that captures the variation between country-years (Enders & 
Tofighi, 2007). All continuous variables are standardized by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by two standard deviations to facilitate comparisons of the magnitude 
of the coefficients within the same model (Gelman, 2008). While the values of the 
coefficients cannot be compared across models because of differences in the scale 
factor in non-linear probability models, their directions and significance levels 
remain informative (Breen, Karlson, & Holm, 2018).
To estimate the models I used the glmer command in the lme4 package 
in R (Bates, et al., 2015), the ggeffects package (Lüdecke, 2018) to create the 
plots, and the stargazer package (Hlavac, 2018) for the tables. Multiple other R 
packages were used in the analysis: rio (Chan, Chan, Leeper, & Becker, 2018) to 
import and export data sets, tidyverse (Wickham, 2017) to clean and transform 
the data, janitor (Firke, 2019) to clean up variable names, fastDummies to 
recode categorical variables into sets of dummies (Kaplan, 2019), democracy-
Data (Marquez, 2018) and WDI (Arel-Bundock, 2019) to download democracy and 
economic indicators, and countrycode (Arel-Bundock, Enevoldsen, & Yetman, 
2018) to switch between country names and codes.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analysis in their 
original metrics.
Variable name Mean /  Proportion* Std. dev. Min Max
Individual-level variables (n = 356,874)
Participation in demonstrations 0.193 0 1
Trust in parliament 4.508 2.282 0.71 9.29
Trust in parliament (group mean centered) 0.001 2.097 -6.829 7.146
Education, years 10.587 4.363 0 18
Age, years 42.457 16.456 14 96
Female 0.512 0 1
Household income 38.722 27.165 0 100
Country-year-level variables (n = 319)
Freedom House, reversed 9.395 2.902 0 12
GDP per capita, 000 20.627 15.061 1.088 94.900
GDP per capita, ln 9.611 0.888 6.992 11.461
Trust in parliament, sample mean 4.506 0.879 2.144 8.179
Year 1989 2009
Methodological variables (n = 319)
Non-response on demonstrations 0.054 0.053 0.000 0.350
Question on demonstrations extended 0.160 0 1
Education filled with schooling years 0.213 0 1
Trust in parliament scale length
4 points 0.784 0 1
5 points 0.103 0 1
7 points 0.113 0 1
Sample type
No information 0.110 0 1
Insufficient information 0.232 0 1
Quota 0.313 0 1
Random route 0.154 0 1
Multistage address 0.078 0 1
Multistage individual 0.078 0 1
Single-stage 0.034 0 1
Survey project
Americas Barometer 0.113 0 1
Asia Europe Survey 0.047 0 1
European Values Study 0.317 0 1
International Social Survey Programme 0.103 0 1
World Values Survey 0.420 0 1
* Proportions in the case of binary variables.
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Results
Estimates of the conditional three-level models explaining individual participa-
tion in demonstrations are presented in Table 2. Model 1 is the baseline model 
with individual- and country-year-level covariates and controls, and random inter-
cepts for all covariates. According to the model estimates, individual education and 
household income on average have a positive effect on participating in demonstra-
tions, which is in line with the resource approach to explaining political participa-
tion. The standardized effect of education is about five times stronger than that of 
income, pointing to the role of non-economic resources in shaping participation 
decisions. The association between participation in demonstrations and the coun-
try‘s quality of democracy is also positive, in line with the expected role of political 
openness for political participation. The average linear effect of trust in parliament 
is weakly negative and not statistically significantly different from zero at the cus-
tomary 0.05 level.
Coefficients for the individual-level control variables also largely conform to 
prior findings: participation in demonstrations is higher among men and the asso-
ciation with age forms an inverse-U, where the predicted probability of participat-
ing increases with age, peaks around 50 years, and declines to its minimum levels 
in old age. After controlling for the quality of democracy, economic development 
(GDP per capita) is negatively associated with the probability of demonstrating, 
while the effect of mean trust in parliament is positive suggesting that countries 
where individuals on average have more trust in the parliament see higher levels of 
participation in demonstrations.
Model 2 includes the quadratic term of trust in parliament. The coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the conventional level. The predicted asso-
ciation between trust in parliament and participation in demonstrations is hence 
U-shaped, where individuals with the lowest and highest levels of trust in parlia-
ment have the highest probability of participating in demonstrations, while indi-
viduals with medium levels – the lowest probability. This is the opposite pattern 
to the inverted-U that Cichocka et al. (2017) have found with the World Values 
Survey with a different operationalization of participation that took into account 
more activities.
Models 3, 4, and 5 add cross-level interactions of education, income, and trust 
in parliament, respectively, with the level of democracy. The significance of the 
interaction term in non-linear probability models is not a proper test of the interac-
tion effect in terms of predicted probabilities (Mize, 2019), so the interactions are 
explored graphically below.
Model 6 includes all cross-level interactions – between individual education, 
income, and trust in parliament, and the country’s level of democracy. The patterns 
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of associations remain stable with regard to their directions and magnitudes com-
pared to Models 3, 4, and 5 with single interactions.
The final Model 7 adds methodological control variables of two types. The 
first are harmonization controls, which deal with variation in the design of original 
survey items: (a) an indicator for surveys where the original question about demon-
strations also asked about another form of participation apart from demonstrations 
(“Question on demonstrations extended”), (b) information about the length of the 
original response scale in the “trust in parliament” items, and (c) a flag indicat-
ing whether the education variable substitutes schooling years for education lev-
els. The second type includes other methodological controls: (a) the share of item 
non-response in the item about participation in demonstrations, and (b) the sample 
type employed in the given survey. While the coefficients for some of these con-
trols are substantial, they only minimally change the effects of the individual-level 
covariates or the cross-level interactions. At the same time coefficients of macro 
variables – the level of democracy, GDP per capita, and mean trust in parliament 
– are affected much more, even if for the first two variables the directions and 
significance levels of the coefficients remain unchanged. The effect of mean trust 
in parliament becomes not statistically significant after adding control variables 
related to the length of the original response scales, which changes the substantive 
interpretation of the results. These changes in coefficients for macro-level predic-
tors are not surprising given that harmonization controls and the sample type are 
measured on the level of the national survey corresponding to the country-year. As 
a result, including harmonization and quality controls will not likely change coef-
ficients for individual-level predictors, especially if they are group-mean centered, 
but might affect coefficients for macro-level predictors in ways that may be difficult 
to interpret in substantive terms.
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Predicted probabilities of participation in demonstrations illustrating the 
effects of individual education, income, and trust in parliament and their interac-
tions with the level of democracy, with other covariates held at their means or at 
base levels for factors, are presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure 1 shows how the 
positive effects of education increase with increasing levels of democracy, in line 
with Hypothesis 1a. In the least democratic countries (Freedom House score equal 
to 1 on the scale from 0 to 12), the difference between the predicted probability of 
participation in demonstrations for those with no education and those with second-
ary education (12 years of schooling) is less than 3 percentage points, while in the 
most democratic countries (Freedom House score of 12) the difference is around 13 
percentage points. Moving from secondary education (12 years) to tertiary educa-
tion (16 years) corresponds to a change in predicted probability of demonstrating 
by 10 percentage points in democratic countries and by one percentage point in the 
least democratic countries.
Figure 2 presents the association between participation in demonstrations and 
household income at different levels of democracy, and shows that the effect of 
income on participating in demonstrations is positive at all levels of democracy, 
and is stronger the higher the more democratic the country. Moving from the lowest 
income to the highest income in non-democratic countries increases the probabil-
 
Figure 1 Predicted probability of participation in demonstrations by education 
and democracy (based on Model 7).
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ity of participation by less than 5 percentage points, while in the most democratic 
countries the corresponding change is by around 8 percentage points. These results 
need to be taken with a grain of salt given how imperfect the harmonized measure 
of household income is. It is possible that the observed interaction effect is due to 
differences in the measurement of income between surveys, or in the distribution of 
income between less and more democratic countries. Even if real, the difference in 
the magnitude of the effect of income by level of democracy is far smaller than of 
the effects of education, and the support for Hypothesis 1b is weak at best.
The predicted levels of participation in demonstrations depending on trust 
in parliament and by levels of democracy are presented in Figure 3, showing the 
U-shaped association between the probability of demonstrating in non-democratic 
countries. In these countries, the highest predicted probability of participating in 
demonstrations is for individuals with the lowest levels of trust in parliament at 
0.13. Individuals with a medium-high level of trust in parliament have the low-
est predicted probability of demonstrating of 0.065. The predicted probability 
increases for individuals with the highest level of trust in parliament to almost 0.1. 
In democratic countries the association is much flatter, and the difference between 
the lowest and the highest predicted probability of demonstrating is less than 2 
 
Figure 2 Predicted probability of participation in demonstrations by levels of 
income and democracy (based on Model 7).
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percentage points. These results contradict the expectations stated in Hypotheses 
2 and 36.
 
Figure 3 Predicted probability of participation in demonstrations by levels of 
political trust and democracy (based on Model 7).
Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed individual and contextual determinants of participation 
in demonstrations with data from 100 countries between 1989 and 2009, using 
ex-post harmonized data from five international survey projects. Results provide 
mixed support for previous findings and point to new insights. First, the analysis 
reveals systematic variation in the effects of education on participation in dem-
onstrations: the effect of education on participation in demonstrations is positive 
and far stronger in democracies than in non-democracies. This might be because, 
while educated individuals are better at recognizing opportunities for meaningful 
participation and exploiting them, in non-democratic countries the awareness of 
limited chances for success might keep them from taking to the streets. Addition-
ally, educated individuals who engage in protests in non-democratic countries face 
comparatively higher risks of state repression than in democracies. At the same 
time, while the association between income and participation in demonstrations is 
also positive, the magnitude of the effect and its variation across levels of democ-
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racy are much weaker. These results confirm prior findings about the central role of 
education for political participation.
Further, I found that political trust is related to participation in demonstrations 
in a complex way: it is U-shaped, but the pattern is the strongest in the least demo-
cratic countries, and very weak in institutionalized democracies. If in non-democ-
racies both the least and the most trusting citizens demonstrate the most, are they 
participating in the same demonstrations? Perhaps the demonstrations attended 
by individuals who are distrustful of the political regime indeed constitute pro-
test, while in the case of individuals with high political trust in a non-democratic 
country, demonstrations could rather be in support of than against the state (cf. 
Hellmeier & Weidmann, 2019). Standard survey questions about participation in 
demonstrations do not distinguish between demonstrations for and demonstrations 
against the political system, and variation between countries might be exacerbated 
by linguistic differences in the meaning and connotations of the word “demonstra-
tion” or an alternative term used in the survey question. In general, verifying the 
validity of the assumption that participation in demonstrations, as measured in sur-
veys, is a form of protest, could explain some of the mixed findings in the empirical 
literature on this topic.
The second goal of the paper is to provide an illustration of how survey data 
harmonized ex-post can be used in a substantive analysis. The approach to ex-post 
harmonization proposed in the SDR project consists in unifying the coding of orig-
inal (source) variables that are identified as measuring the same concept by either 
mapping the original values onto a common coding scheme or by rescaling the 
responses to a common range, in addition to constructing auxiliary variables to 
record selected properties of the source variables. In this paper, I showed how the 
harmonized data created in the SDR approach can be applied to a concrete research 
problem.
Data from ex-post harmonization, such as performed in the SDR project, are 
not without limitations. First, while the SDR data set increases country coverage 
through harmonization of survey data from different cross-national surveys, the 
inequality in country coverage persists, and the time series for less developed coun-
tries remain short and sparse, especially after selecting a subset of the data set 
with the necessary harmonized variables. Second, the harmonization of variables 
requires that survey projects include the same or very similar questions. As a con-
sequence, analyses are limited by the number of available harmonized variables 
enabling the estimation of fairly modest models. Such models can identify only 
broad patterns of associations for further examination with richer data sets.
Third, the process of harmonization as employed in the SDR project entails 
information loss and may introduce bias when response categories are collapsed, or 
when original responses measured with ordinal rating scales are treated as continu-
ous and rescaled. Overall, ex-post harmonization introduces harmonization error 
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with unknown properties. The SDR framework aims to mitigate this by construct-
ing control variables that are supposed to capture the aspects of question design 
that are lost in the process of standardization as well as the methodological and 
quality variation between the different surveys, but the extent to which this is suc-
cessful is yet to be adequately examined. As this paper shows, analyses focusing 
on individual-level predictors or cross-level interactions yield stable results whether 
or not methodological and quality controls are applied. At the same time caution 
is advised when analyzing the effects of macro-level variables, as they can be cor-
related with the methodological and quality controls in spurious ways, which would 
have an effect on model coefficients, and could result in interpreting data artifacts 
in substantive terms.
The more general question is how to balance the costs and benefits of harmo-
nizing survey data that were not a priori intended for joint analysis. On the one 
hand, research in cross-cultural survey methodology has led to the development of 
standards and guidelines that greatly improve the comparability of cross-national 
survey data and has demonstrated how disregarding these standards during the sur-
vey process may hurt the comparability of the resulting data (Survey Research Cen-
ter, 2016). This research is focused on improving future data collection efforts, and 
implicitly questions the value of cross-national data sets constructed from surveys 
that were collected without careful ex-ante considerations of comparability at all 
stages of the survey process. On the other hand, surveys carried out over the last 
several decades in many countries worldwide are valuable as historical evidence, 
and researchers may be tempted to harmonize all of them together regardless of 
their known or suspected limitations. 
In the middle ground between the extreme positions of dismissing any ex-
post harmonization and combining all surveys regardless of their quality, there 
seem to be two main questions. The first pertains to the minimum standards for 
including a survey data set in a comparative analysis, with the discussion likely 
organized around issues related to the quality of the sample and of the measure-
ment. The second question deals with methods of modeling survey data stemming 
from ex-post harmonization, and limitations to the types of statistical analyses that 
can be performed with such data. Efforts aimed at formulating recommendations 
in response to both questions would benefit from a comprehensive framework to 
evaluate survey quality. The quality assessment approach in the SDR project con-
structed quality indicators in three dimensions: quality of data, quality of docu-
mentation, and correspondence between the data and the documentation (Slom-
czynski & Tomescu-Dubrow, 2018). Others have attempted to assess the quality of 
survey samples on the basis of internal and external criteria of representativeness 
(Jabkowski & Cichocki, 2019; Kohler, 2007; Kołczyńska, Cichocki, & Jabkowski, 
2019). While promising, these attempts face limitations related to the data and doc-
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umentation, and further work is also needed in the area of measurement equiva-
lence with survey data harmonized ex-post.
Finally, while debating the limitations of ex-post survey harmonization, it is 
worth remembering that many of the same challenges apply – although arguably to 
a lesser extent – to data within a single cross-national survey project, which goes 
largely unaddressed in empirical studies. Cross-national survey projects often col-
lect data following different protocols in different countries, and these protocols 
change from edition to edition. Other aspects of survey quality, including documen-
tation standards and survey outcome rates, also vary – within the same project – 
across countries and change over time (Jabkowski, 2018; Kołczyńska & Slomczyn-
ski, 2018; Oleksiyenko, Wysmułek, & Vangeli, 2018). Further, variables available in 
single cross-national survey data sets also face limitations with regard to their com-
parability and interpretability (Donnelly & Pop-Eleches, 2018), and survey projects 
themselves often ex-post harmonize the coding of socio-demographic variables, a 
process prone to errors. 
The discussion about the consequences of combining survey data collected 
following different standards and procedures, and about minimum thresholds for 
data quality, is thus not limited to ex-post harmonized data from different projects, 
but also applies to analyses of data from single cross-national survey projects. Ulti-
mately, it is up to the researcher to decide which surveys are of sufficiently high 
quality to be included in the analysis. Since most researchers are secondary data 
users, the availability and high information content of survey documentation is of 
utmost importance in this process.
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